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Abstract—Since the advent of software defined networks
(SDN), there have been many attempts to outsource the complex
and costly local network functionality, i.e. the middlebox, to
the cloud in the same way as outsourcing computation and
storage. The privacy issues, however, may thwart the enterprises’
willingness to adopt this innovation since the underlying config-
urations of these middleboxes may leak crucial and confidential
information which can be utilized by attackers. To address this
new problem, we use firewall as an sample functionality and
propose the first privacy preserving outsourcing framework and
schemes in SDN. The basic technique that we exploit is a ground-
breaking tool in cryptography, the cryptographic multilinear map.
In contrast to the infeasibility in efficiency if a naive approach
is adopted, we devise practical schemes that can outsource the
middlebox as a blackbox after obfuscating it such that the
cloud provider can efficiently perform the same functionality
without knowing its underlying private configurations. Both
theoretical analysis and experiments on real-world firewall rules
demonstrate that our schemes are secure, accurate, and practical.
I. INTRODUCTION
Although network functionalities play an important role
in enterprise network to make it robust, fast, and secure,
they often burden a company with great hardware financial
pressure and management complexity. Network middleboxes,
such as firewalls and intrusion detection systems (IDS), are
the customized appliances to implement these sophisticated
functionalities, and they are also often hard to deploy and
upgrade. A recent survey [1] reveals that the investments in
network infrastructures deployment of these middleboxes as
well as in the personnel cost of managing and maintaining
them are substantial.
The emergence of SDN helps us separate the logic control
from the basic traffic processing, so we can relieve some of the
above “pain points” to a certain extent by taking the advantage
of SDN [2]–[5]. But though the management of networks can
be simplified by SDN, it still has many shortcomings. For
instance, because these functionalities are still implemented
within the enterprise network, the hardware cost and the
everyday maintenance cost are still there.
Thus, to further reduce the cost and complexity faced by
local networks, some SDN researchers have attempted to
outsource these network functionalities or middleboxes out to
cloud providers, in the same way that the computation and
storage services have been successfully outsourced [1], [6]. Af-
ter migrating middleboxes to cloud, the local enterprises will
receive better services with less expenditure and management
complexity since the cloud provider can deploy more advanced
hardware and hire professional experts to offer better network
functionality services by taking advantage of economies of
scale. Moreover, the local enterprise can also have a clearer
and more elastic network infrastructure.
However, the outsourcing of local SDN middleboxes may
bring in serious privacy issues [1]. Because at present, an
enterprise has to provide the detailed underlying configurations
of these middleboxes, which may embody very sensitive and
important enterprise secrets, when outsourcing middleboxes.
For example, the configurations of firewalls or IDS may reveal
what the enterprise network topology looks like and how
different sectors within an enterprise are regulated. These
policies or configurations are set and known by a restricted
few administrators even before outsourcing. Were these con-
fidential pieces of information hidden in these polices to be
exposed to adversaries, they may be utilized to impose a great
threat to the enterprise [7].
In brief, the new challenges in this scenario now we face
are: 1) we need to protect the private information hidden in the
configurations of these outsourced middleboxes; 2) we need to
allow the cloud provider to perform the network functionalities
without mistakes ( or with acceptable errors). Note that in line
with existing outsourcing architecture in SDN [1], [6], [8], we
assume that the cloud provider for an enterprise is its Internet
Service Providers (ISP), so we will not consider the protection
of the packet flows of the enterprise here.
In this paper, we try to address these challenges by de-
signing a privacy preserving scheme for network middlebox
outsourcing in SDN, exploiting a cryptographic multilinear
map, a powerful cryptographic tool that was recently invented
[9]–[11]. To keep things concrete, in this paper we will take
firewalls, a typical and indispensable network middlebox, as a
case study.
The main idea of our scheme is to use cryptographic
multilinear map to obfuscate the rules in a firewall efficiently
such that the original configurations are protected while their
functionality is preserved. The theoretical foundation of our
idea is cryptographic program obfuscation [12], [13]. In our
work, we first present framework SOFA (Secure framework
for Outsourcing FirewAll). This framework consists of two
phases. First, the controller in the enterprise SDN constructs
a cryptographic obfuscator for the firewall based on its
2rules. This obfuscator encodes the firewall rules such that
the underlying confidential information cannot be derived.
Then this enterprise transmits this obfuscated firewall to a
provider. In the second phase, the cloud provider performs
the firewall functionality by filtering incoming and outgoing
network traffics with this obfuscated firewall without knowing
the detailed configurations. Based on this overall framework,
a basic scheme and two enhanced schemes are proposed to
address the detailed technical issues.
To summarize, we have made three main contributions in
our work:
• To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to deal
with the privacy problem about network functionality
outsourcing (NFO) in SDN. The obfuscation approach
we propose has a solid theoretical foundation. And frame-
work SOFA is compatible with existing SDN outsourcing
architecture, such as APLOMB [1].
• To outsource firewalls as a concrete example, we propose
a basic scheme which is efficient in the first phase,
and two enhanced schemes which can further improve
the efficiency in the second phase. We also analyse the
complexity and security of our algorithms to show that
they are efficient, secure, and reliable.
• We implement a prototype of our schemes, and evaluate
its performance on real-world firewall rules, the results
show that our proposed schemes are practical.
Our paper are organized as follows. First, we review some
related work in section II. In section III, we give formal
definition to the privacy issues in network functionality out-
sourcing and introduce some basic cryptographic backgrounds.
In section IV, we present framework SOFA and a basic
scheme. Some approaches which can boost its efficiency are
discussed in V. The security of these algorithms is analysed in
section VI. Evaluation of SOFA with firewall rules is presented
in section VII. Finally, in section VIII we conclude our work
and discuss some potential future research directions.
II. RELATED WORKS
In this section, we review some recent works on outsourcing
frameworks in SDN, some privacy-preserving outsourcing
techniques in cloud computing or traditional enterprise net-
works. We can see that no existing work can effectively
address the novel challenges we have proposed.
A. Outsourcing network functionality in SDN
There has already been much research done about the
outsourcing of network middleboxes services exploiting the
advantage of SDN [1], [6], [8], [14], [15]. Sherry et al. [1]
design and implement a prototype of APLOMB architecture,
by which the middlebox processing within enterprises can be
outsourced to clouds. This architecture is mainly intended to
deal with the problem of how to redirect the traffic to/from
the enterprise SDN to the cloud without greatly damaging
performance. It is compatible with many specific middleboxes,
such as firewalls. Gibb et al. [6] also envision outsourcing
these network functionalities to external Feature Providers.
The main goal of their work is to provide anyone with chances
to be a network service provider without any limitation on
location. Cloud-Assisted Routing [8] is another scheme aimed
at offloading the local computation-intensive and memory-
intensive operations in the routing functionality to the cloud.
There is only a little current research concerning the privacy
and security problem of outsourcing network functionality in
SDN. Fayazbakhsh et al. [16] mainly discuss the roadmap
to construct a verifiable NFO architecture that can verify the
correctness on intended functionality, performance assurance
and can audit the actual workload in the cloud.
However, none of the these works about outsourcing in SDN
can address the privacy challenges we have stated.
B. Privacy Preserving outsourcing in Cloud Computing
In literature, many schemes are designed to tackle the
privacy problem of outsourcing data storage and computation
rather than the network middlebox [17], [18]. However, be-
cause the network functionality is often performed on real-
time packet traffics in the cloud, its requirement is different.
For example, the well-known public auditing framework [17]
introduces a third party auditor to help cloud users check the
integrity of their outsourced data. However, in this framework
the user files are sent to the cloud directly without encryption,
so it will not be applicable to network middlebox outsourcing.
So these existing approaches for cloud computing or storage
are incapable of addressing this new problem.
Khakpour and Liu [7] present Landon, a framework to
address the problem of how to protect the firewall policies
when it is outsourced to a cloud provider in traditional
enterprise networks. The main idea of this framework is to
convert the raw access control lists to an equivalent Firewall
Decision Diagram (FDD) and then to anonymize the FDD
with Bloom Filters. This framework works well after some
complex optimization methods are used. The limitation of this
framework is that it is based on a specific presentation (FDD)
of firewall and the Bloom Filter is not very secure and has
some drawbacks [19].
C. Related Cryptographical Research
In cryptography, there is also some theoretical work dealing
with similar problems, such as methods based on Yao’s
garbled circuits for secure multi-party computation [20]. In
particular, recently Brakerski and Rothblum [9] propose an
elegant construction for obfuscating conjunctions based on an
asymmetric multilinear map. This is the fundamental cryp-
tographic tool we will use in this paper. But their work
focuses on the theoretical construction and security proof
of obfuscating a single conjunction. So their result, though
significant in theory, will be impractical in practice in directly
obfuscating numerous firewall rules. We will discuss this
problem at length in section IV.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION AND PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we formulate the privacy problems of NFO
in SDN. To this end, we first review the overall architecture for
outsourcing network functionality, and give its threat model.
3TABLE I: Firewall Rule Examples
rule
#
Source Destination
Protocol Action
IP Port IP Port
1 192.168.45.* * * * * deny
2 10.*.*.* * 192.168.4.* 80 TCP permit
3 10.56.*.* * 192.168.*.* [22,88] TCP permit
4 114.212.190.* 8000 * 8090 UDP deny
Specifically, we give a definition for privacy preserving out-
sourcing firewalls. In addition, we also recall some important
cryptographic backgrounds about multilinear map.
A. System Model
The overall architecture for outsourcing network functional-
ity to cloud has been proposed, such as APLOMB [1] and Jin-
gling [6]. In such architecture, enterprise administrators spec-
ify the policies of middleboxes with its local SDN controller in
a simple way. Then by the communication mechanism between
the enterprise clients and the cloud provider, these policies are
transmitted to the cloud controller and service requirements
are also negotiated. The controller in cloud SDN then trans-
late these policies into low-level network configurations for
middleboxes, and then manage the cloud network resources
to carry out the tasks. The traffic redirection of the enterprise
network flows is also managed by this architecture. We will
focus on the privacy protection of middlebox configurations
in the above related procedures.
B. Threat Model
We assume that the cloud middlebox provider is semi-honest
since in the outsourcing system model, the cloud providers
are commonly the ISPs for enterprises. Because the provider
performs network tasks on packet traffics of the enterprise,
it will be able to observe the input packets and the output
actions of them. So the semi-honest provider may be curious
to learn information from these input-output histories. But the
provider should not actively generate tremendous packets to
attack the outsourced middlebox MB′ for such an attack will
affect the service quality it provides. So the two main threats
we consider are the analysis of the outsourced MB′ itself, and
the analysis of its running input-output history.
C. Problem Definition
Different middleboxes have their own characteristic in de-
tailed configurations, thus in the following we focus on the
firewall as an example. The configuration of a typical IP
firewall f is an ordered sequence of rules, and they are usually
presented in the format of access control lists (ACLs). Some
examples are shown in Table I. Technically, the rules can be
classified as two types: standard ACLs and extended ACLs.
The standard rules only allow you to deny or permit packets
by specifying the source IP addresses, like the first one in
Table I. Extended rules also allow you to specify the protocol
type, the destination address and the port ranges, like the other
examples in table I. Once the configuration are settled, the
firewall can perform packet filtering based on these rules to
protect an enterprise network.
The rules of the firewall are what we need to protect since
they may reveal, for example, much information of the enter-
prise’s inner network topology and its security vulnerabilities.
Specifically, we think that the IP address is more important
than TCP port since the IP address determines the host end
while the TCP ports are for specific processes in a host.
Formally, we give the following definition:
Definition 1. (Privacy Preserving Firewall Problem) The
Privacy preserving of a firewall f is the construction of a
semantically equivalent secure firewall f´ such that (1) for
every packet p, the probability of the decisions on it by f´ and
f are different is negligible, (2) it should be computationally
efficient to perform the filtering tasks with f´, and (3) there
should be no computationally efficient ways to get the whole
original plain rules of f based on f´ itself.
It should be easy for us to give privacy preserving definitions
for other network middleboxes similarly.
D. Preliminaries
Here, we first review the definition of cryptographic
multilinear map, which is the cornerstone of our algorithms.
Definition 2. (κ-multilinear Map [11], [21]) For κ+1 cyclic
groups G1, . . . , Gκ, GT of the same order p, a κ-multilinear
map e : G1 × · · · ×Gκ → GT has the following properties:
(1) For elements g1 ∈ G1, . . . , gκ ∈ Gκ, index i ∈ [κ] and
an integer α ∈ Zp, we have:
e(g1, . . . , α · gi, . . . , gκ) = α · e(g1, . . . , gκ)
(2) The map e is non-degenerate, which means that if gi ∈
Gi (i = 1, . . . , κ) is a generator of Gi, then e(g1, . . . , gκ) is
a generator of the target group GT .
In the above definition, if Gi (i = 1, . . . , κ) are all identical
groups, it is called a symmetric multilinear map.
A cryptographic multilinear map has been a long sought
after and powerful tool. Not until recently was it approximately
constructed in the form of Graded Encoding System [10],
[11]. In particular, we will design our algorithms based on
the construction over integers, which is a more practical one
devised by Coron, Lepoint, and Tibouchi [10]. Now we briefly
recall the definition of Graded Encoding System (GES) and
its associated efficient procedures for manipulating encodings
on which the description of our algorithms is based directly.
Note that we only consider the symmetric case here.
Definition 3. (κ−Graded Encoding System [11]) A κ-Graded
Encoding System consists of a ring R and a system of sets
S = {S
(α)
v ∈ {0, 1}
∗
: v ∈ N, α ∈ R}, with the following
properties:
1. For every v ∈ N, the sets {S(α)v : α ∈ R} are disjoint.
2. There is an associate binary operation ‘+’ and a self-
inverse unary operation ‘−’ (on {0, 1}∗) such that for every
α1, α2 ∈ R, every index i ≤ κ, and every u1 ∈ S(α1)i and
u2 ∈ S
(α2)
i , it holds that
u1 + u2 ∈ S
(α1+α2)
i , −u1 ∈ S
(−α1)
i
4where α1 + α2 and −α1 are addition and negation in R.
3. There is an associate binary operation ‘×’ (on {0, 1}∗)
such that for every α1, α2 ∈ R, every i1, i2 with i1 + i2 ≤ κ,
and every u1 ∈ S(α1)i1 and u2 ∈ S
(α2)
i2
, it holds that u1×u2 ∈
S
(α1·α2)
i1+i2
. Here α1 · α2 is multiplication in R, and i1 + i2 is
integer addition.
Definition 4. (Efficient Procedures for κ-Graded Encoding
System [10], [11]) For graded encoding system, we have the
following efficient procedures:
Instance Generation:(params, Pzt) ← InstGen(1λ, 1κ),
where params is a description of a κ-Graded Encoding
System with security parameter λ, and Pzt is a zero-test
parameter for level κ.
Ring Sampler: c ← samp(params). This procedure out-
puts a “level-zero encoding” c ∈ S(α)0 for a nearly uniform
element α ∈R R.
Encoding: ck ← enc(params, k, c). This procedure out-
puts the “level-i encoding” ck ∈ S(α)i for a “level-zero
encoding” c ∈ S(α)0 .
Re-Randomization: c′ ← reRand(params, i, c). Proce-
dure reRand can re-randomize encodings relative to the same
level i.
Addition and negation: u′ ← add(params, i, u, u) and
u′ ← neg(params, i, u). The two procedures are corre-
sponding to operation ‘+’ and ‘−’ in the above definition.
Multiplication: u′ ← mul(params, i, u, i, u). This
procedure is for operation ‘×’ in the above definition.
Zero Testing: isZero(params, Pzt, uκ)
?
= /. This proce-
dure will check whether uκ ∈ S(0)κ .
Extraction: sk ← ext(params, Pzt, uκ). This procedure
extracts a “canonical” and “random” representation of ring
elements from their level-κ encoding.
IV. SOFA: FRAMEWORK AND A BASIC SCHEME
As a concrete example for secure network middlebox out-
sourcing, we present SOFA in detail in this section. First,
we will introduce our framework which is comprised of two
phases, the obfuscating phase and the online execution phase.
Then we give a naive scheme by directly applying the theoreti-
cal conjunction obfuscation technique [9]. The discussion of its
lack of feasibility will lead to our basic scheme, which is much
more efficient in obfuscating the original firewall. And in the
next section, we will further present another two approaches
to boost our scheme’s efficiency in execution phase.
A. Fundamental Framework
A cryptographic obfuscator of a program can make a
program perform the same functionality while the detailed
underlying instructions are hidden [12]. Combining the idea
of program obfuscation and the Definition 1, we observe
that the privacy preserving firewall problem can be solved by
constructing a cryptographic obfuscator O for firewall f such
that f´=O(f). The secrets are the underlying firewall rules, and
they can be hidden in f´. Generally, this relationship between
privacy preserving outsourcing requirement and cryptographic
obfuscator construction can be extended to other middleboxes.
Our framework SOFA consists of two phases. The first
phase is the construction of an obfuscator for original firewall
f. And this work is done by the control plane of SDN in
the local enterprise. The second phase is the execution of the
obfuscated firewall f´=O(f) in the cloud. And this task should
be done by the control plane of cloud firewall provider.
Obfuscation Phase: In the first phase, the controller of the
enterprise SDN can set up the basic cryptographic parameters
of the multilinear map. And then for each rule r in the
firewall, such as these in Table I, the control plane generates
a corresponding atomic rule “ciphertext” r´. Subsequently,
the control plane can aggregate these atomic ciphertexts to
be an integral secure firewall f´. And at last it sends f´ and
some necessary public parameters to the cloud provider. This
obfuscation phase for firewall can be done offline and once
for all. And if there are some updates for the firewall f, we
can just reconstruct the related atomic rules, reassemble them
and then replace the old ones in f´ with them. But this process
still should be done as efficiently as possible since one main
purpose of outsourcing is to reduce costs for enterprises.
Execution Phase: After receiving f´, the cloud firewall
provider performs the packet filtering task on the inbound
and outbound traffics of the protected enterprise. For each
packet, the high-performance devices in the cloud, under the
supervision of its controller, securely checks its packet header
according to f´. If the packet is found satisfying a rule r´,
the cloud firewall devices will take the corresponding actions
associated with this rule, such as permitting it, or denying it.
The firewall obfuscation is implemented with cryptographic
multilinear map. So in the following we model the firewall
rule and traffic packet header in the bitwise level. For each
rule, we present it in the format of R = (~v,W,A), where
~v ∈ {0, 1}
n
specifies the expected bit, 0 or 1, on non-
wildcard bits, the set W ⊆ [n] specifies the “wildcard” bits,
and A indicates the associated actions. Note that actually set
W is often the subnet mask in firewall rules. For ease of
presentation, we denote ~v [i] = 0 if i ∈ W . For instance,
the rule #1 in Table I, “192.168.45.*”, can be presented as
~v = “1100000010101000...”, W = {25, 26, . . . , 32} and
A = {deny}. In addition, A is the output decision on a packet,
it leaks little information about the detailed enterprise network,
so we do not consider protecting it in this paper. Please see
section VI for a detailed analysis of our schemes’ security.
Similarly, for a tarffic packet’s TCP/IP header, we also present
its related bits as a n-bit vector ~p ∈ {0, 1}n.
B. A Naive Scheme
A naive and intuitive idea is to directly apply the theoretical
construction of conjunction obfuscator [9] in obfuscating the
firewall rules. Here we give a concise description of this
scheme. For each rule r in firewall f, we present it as
r , (~v,W,A). Then for the i-th bit of it, we generate two pairs
of level-1 encodings in the GES (We term them “encoding
pairs unit”):
(ui,0, vi,0) ∈ (S
ρi,0
1 , S
ρi,0×αi,0
1 ), (1)
(ui,1, vi,1) ∈ (S
ρi,1
1 , S
ρi,1×αi,1
1 ) (2)
5In Equation (1) and (2), ρi,0, αi,0, ρi,1, αi,1 are all randomly
and uniformly chosen if i /∈ W , but for i ∈ W , they should
also satisfy αi,0 = αi,1. In addition to two pairs for each bit,
an encoding pair is also generated for a whole rule:
(un+1, vn+1) ∈ (S
ρn+1
1 , S
ρn+1×
∏
i∈[n] αi,~v[i]
1 ) (3)
In the execution phase, for each obfuscated rule, we pick
and multiply encodings from each pair according to ~p and get
the following two (n+1)-level encodings:
LHS = un+1 ×
∏
i∈[n]
vi,~p[i], RHS = vn+1 ×
∏
i∈[n]
ui,~p[i] (4)
At last procedure isZero is performed to determine whether
LHS (Left-hand side) and RHS (Right-hand side) are equal
to judge whether packet ~p satisfies this rule and which actions
to take.
Actually, the scheme we briefly presented above is the
simplified symmetric counterpart for the original asymmet-
ric construction in [9], and the asymmetry is vital in its
theoretical security proof to defend the DDH attack which
may leak the wildcard locations. It is much harder and
inefficient to construct such an asymmetric multilinear map.
More importantly, as we all know, the wildcard part in a IP
address is for indicating the subnet range, and these bits are
always continuous in the later part. Nothing additional useful
information about specific subnets or hosts, except for the the
size of an unknown subnet, can be discovered without ~v. So
leaking this subnet mask rather than the specific prefixes ( ~v
) is acceptable in most firewall scenarios. Thus in this paper,
we do not attempt to perfectly defend such DDH attack and
herein we use symmetric multilinear map in all our schemes
and leave such protection as future work. But we point out
that following schemes are also fit for asymmetric one.
Discussion. Now we argue that this naive scheme will have
serious issues in practical application.
(1) Its time and space consumption in the obfuscating phase
will be too large. If we have l rules in a firewall, then
the obfuscation will take Θ(ln + l) times encoding and re-
randomization, and need store Θ(ln+ l) encoding ciphertexts.
In addition, when n is large, the singe procedures will take
more time and the storage will also be larger. So such privacy
preserving scheme will be impractical due to the computation
and storage cost in obfuscating phase is hardly acceptable.
(2) When n is large, it also will be much harder to construct
the GES due to the noise limit. Thus to make the 2(n + 1)
multiplication operations and isZero viable, the underlying
GES parameters have to be set large enough. Consequently
the real-time execution in cloud will be too inefficient to have
any practical usability if we adopt the naive scheme directly.
Therefore we have to make up for these limitations to make
it more practical.
C. Our Basic Scheme
Here, we first give a basic scheme by compressing the
encodings to address the issue (1) discussed above. The com-
putation and space complexity will be reduced from Θ(ln+ l)
to Θ(n + l) encodings. This scheme is not as secure as the
Algorithm 1 Basic Scheme For Obfuscating Firewall
Input: A original plain firewall f with rule sets {r}.
Output: A obfuscated firewall f´ with the same functionality.
(params, Pzt)← InstGen(1
λ, 1n+1).
for i ∈ {1, . . . ,M +N} do
Cρi,0 ← samp(·), Cρi,1 ← samp(·).
if i ≤M then
Cαi,0 = Cαi,1 ← samp(·).
else
Cαi,0 ← samp(·), Cαi,1 ← samp(·).
end if
Cβ ← enc(·, 1, Cρi,0), ui,0 ← reRand(·, 1, Cβ).
Cγ ← enc(·, 1, Cρi,0 × Cαi,0), vi,0 ← reRand(·, 1, Cγ).
Cδ ← enc(·, 1, Cρi,1), ui,1 ← reRand(·, 1, Cδ).
Cǫ ← enc(·, 1, Cρi,1 × Cαi,1), vi,1 ← reRand(·, 1, Cǫ).
C[i] , {(ui,0, vi,0), (ui,1, vi,1)}.
end for
C=σ(C).
E = {σ(1), . . . , σ(M)},
UE = {σ(M + 1), . . . , σ(M +N)}.
for r , (~v,W,A) ∈ f do
for i ∈ {1, . . . , n} do
if i ∈ W then
Pr[i]
R
8 E.
else
Pr[i]
R
8 UE.
end if
end for
ρi,n+1 ← samp(·),
Cθ ← enc(·, 1, Cρi,n+1), un+1 ← reRand(·, 1, Cθ).
Cµ ← enc(·, 1, Cρi,n+1 ×
∏
i∈[n]C[Pr [i]].Cαi,~v[i]),
vn+1 ← reRand(·, 1, Cµ).
r´ ,
(
Pr, un+1, vn+1, A
)
.
end for
return f´, ({C[i]}i∈[M+N ], {r′}, Pzt, params′
)
.
naive one, but the amount of leaked information is limited and
acceptable ( please see section VI for details).
In the naive scheme, the encoding pairs (ui,0, vi,0) and
(ui,1, vi,1) for every rule are dependent on W while the pair
(un+1, vn+1) is dependent on ~v. Now we give our basic
scheme, in which the encoding pairs for each bit every rule
are extracted and shared.
The obfuscating steps are summarized as Algorithm 11
utilizing primitive procedures in GES. We first get M + N
encoding pairs units, of which the first M units have equal
random ratios in two encoding pairs while in the last N units
such ratios are different. Then we permute (σ) these encoding
pairs units to shuffle them, and then collect two indexes sets:
E = {σ(1), σ(2), . . . , σ(M)}, (5)
UE = {σ(M + 1), σ(M + 2), . . . , σ(M +N)}. (6)
1For conciseness, we denote the parameter params as “ · ” in every
primitive procedure in all our following algorithms. In addition, The C we
outsource do not contains Cαi,~v[i] , but in the obfuscating phase, we use
C[Pr[i]].Cαi,~v[i] to denote the access for presentation convenience.
6Algorithm 2 Execution with Outsourced Firewall f´
Input: A packet ~p = {0, 1}n, and obfuscated firewall f´.
Output: Decisions on ~p.
for r´ ,
(
Pr, un+1, vn+1, A
)
∈ f´ do
LHS = un+1 ×
∏
i∈[n] C[Pr [i]].vi,~p[i],
RHS = vn+1 ×
∏
i∈[n] C[Pr[i]].ui,~p[i].
if isZero(params′, Pzt, LHS −RHS) then
return A and exit.
else
Continue checking ~p with the next rule.
end if
end for
Set E collects the indexes of encoding pairs units with αi,0 =
αi,1 while set UE collects those with αi,0 6= αi,1.
To obfuscate a rule r , (~v,W,A), we attach an encoding
pairs unit indexes array pr to r´ such that if i ∈W , then pr[i]
is randomly sampled without replacement ( R8) from set E,
otherwise it is randomly sampled without replacement from
set UE. Thus pr specifies the n encoding pairs units for
rule r. Then (un+1, vn+1) for this rule is calculated according
to Equation (3) by choosing encoding pairs in C[Pr[i]] with
~v. At last, public parameters params′ of GES and zero-test
parameter Pzt are also included in the obfuscated firewall
f´. We emphasize that we should sample randomly without
replacement rather than directly sampling with replacement.
This trick is used to eliminate the possibility of false positive
which may happen when two non-wildcard bits with different
values chose the same encoding pair unit.
In the second phase, the execution of outsourced firewall
f´ is straightforward. The basic steps are summarized in
Algorithm 2. For an input packet ~p, we check whether it
satisfies an underlying rule in f´ sequentially. Note that for
each obfuscated rule r´, the multiplications are also performed
on encodings chose from encoding pairs units C specified by
~p and Pr.
Our scheme’s correctness can be verified easily. In Algo-
rithm 1, only two encodings are generated to a specific rule.
The overheads of Pr generation is negligible compared to
encoding and re-randomization, thus it is easy to figure out
the complexity of Algorithm 1 is Θ(n + l). Thus the basic
scheme is efficient in the obfuscation phase. The efficiency in
execution phase is not bad, but needs further improvement.
V. ONLINE EFFICIENCY IMPROVEMENT
In this section, we try to improve the efficiency and us-
ability of our scheme in the online execution phase. As we
have discussed previously, the online efficiency is vital for
middlebox outsourcing scheme. The two enhanced schemes
we propose here can reduce its complexity from Θ(n) to Θ(k)
or Θ(n/k) on faster encodings’ multiplication operations. The
cost is Θ(1) increasement in encoding and re-randomization
in the first phase.
The main guideline for our improvement is to reduce over-
heads of single multiplication and the times of multiplication.
To this end, in both of the following approaches, we partition
Algorithm 3 Firewall Obfuscation (Blocking Approach)
Input: A original plain firewall f with rule sets {r}.
Output: A obfuscated firewall f´ with the same functionality.
Generate parameters:
(params, Pzt)← InstGen(1
λ, 1k+1).
for r , ({Fi}i∈[k], A) ∈ f do
for i ∈ {1, . . . , k} do
Cηi ← samp(·).
for j ∈ Ii do
Cβj ← samp(·)
if j ∈ Si then
Cαj = Cηi .
else
Cαj ← samp(·).
end if
Cγ ← enc(·, 1, Cβj), Cδ ← enc(·, 1, Cβj × Cαj ),
ui,j ← reRand(·, 1, Cγ), vi,j ← reRand(·, 1, Cδ).
end for
end for
Cρk+1 ← samp(·).
Cǫ ← enc(·, 1, Cρk+1),
uk+1 ← reRand(·, 1, Cǫ),
Cθ ← enc(·, 1, Cρk+1 ×
∏
i∈[k] Cηi),
vk+1 ← reRand(·, 1, Cθ).
r´ ,
(
{(ui,j, vi,j)}i∈[k],j∈Ii , uk+1, vk+1, A
)
.
end for
return f´ , ({r′}, Pzt, params′
)
.
an original bit-wise rule into several parts. In the blocking
approach, we then construct an encoding pair for an element in
each part rather than for each rule bit, and thus we can check a
packet in block level rather bit level. In the divide-and-conquer
approach, we then test if a packet satisfies the rule in each part
separately and sequentially with less encoding levels.
A. Blocking Scheme
We find that if we view a firewall rule in a higher level rather
than the primitive bit level, there will be fewer occurrences of
multiplication needed in online phase. If the block is small
enough, the single multiplication will also take less time. To
this end, we take another approach of firewall obfuscation by
constructing in block level rather than bitwise level. The basic
steps in the first phase are described as algorithm 3.
Note that for brevity and highlighting the key idea, this
algorithm is described based on the naive scheme. The en-
coding pairs compression idea in basic scheme can be easily
integrated in algorithm 3. We omit this integration here.
Specifically, in the first phase, for a firewall rule, we split
it into k fields, each with a small integer range. Take the
second rule in table I as an example, we can split its IP
source address header into four fields, each with the same
domain I1,2,3,4 = [0, 255] (Just as its dotted decimal notation).
In each field, the rule specifies a target filter set, such as
F1 = 192, F2 = 168, F3 = 45 and F4 = [0, 255] for the above
example. Another advantage of this approach is that it enables
us to process some rare extended ACLs with port range. For
7example, for the destination port range in the rule #3 in table
I, we can directly set the corresponding target filter set as
[22, 88]. So now a rule can be presented as r , ({Fi}i∈[k], A).
After this partition, for each field i within the domain Ii, we
“encrypt” each element in it with a level-1 encoding pair. The
key point is that, for all elements that are in the filter set Fi,
the underlying ratios of the two encodings in their encoding
pairs are all equal to a constant number ηi, which is specified
for each field in this obfuscation. Finally, just similar to basic
scheme, these ratios in each field are aggregated in a product
of them, which is also hidden as a ratio in another level-1
encoding pair (uk+1, vk+1):
(uk+1, vk+1) ∈ (S
ρk+1
1 , S
ρk+1×
∏
i∈[k] ηi
1 ) (7)
Then, in the second phase, as a consequence of the sim-
plification in the first phase, the burden of the cloud firewall
provider will be greatly relieved. For a packet ~p, cloud firewall
provider also splits its packet header into k blocks, which
means that we can present it in the format of an integer
tuple (p1, . . . , pk). Then an encodings pair in each field is
chosen according to the integer tuple value followed by the
computation of two level-(k+ 1) encodings,LHS and RHS,
by multiplying them. At last the equality of LHS and RHS
is tested and thus a decision upon this packet can be made.
The modification of algorithm 2 to coordinate with algorithm
3 is easy, so we leave out the details here.
B. Divide-and-Conquer Scheme
To reduce overheads of a single multiplication, we can
decrease the maximum levels in GES. So another strategy we
can take is divide-and-conquer. We divide the whole bit-string
rule (~v,W,A) into k parts: (~v,W,A) = ({~vi,Wi}1≤i≤k, A).
And in each part, we construct a obfuscated r′i in the same way
as algorithm 1. Thus the corresponding obfuscated firewall will
be f ′ ,
({
{r′i}1≤i≤k
}
, {P izt}1≤i≤k, params
′
)
. Similarly, in
the second phase, we also partition the packet in the same
way, and get ~p = (~pi)1≤i≤k. Then we can check whether ~p
matches the underlying r by checking ~pi with r′i in each part
sequentially with algorithm 2.
This approach is simple, but effective, as will be demon-
strated in our experiments. It is not hard to modify the basic
scheme in this approach, so we omit the details here.
VI. PRIVACY ANALYSIS
In this section, we will take a close look at the security of
the privacy preserving schemes we proposed.
1) Analysis of the basic scheme: In [9], the authors have
proved the naive scheme is secure when the inputting function
is drawn from a distribution with a high superlogarithmic en-
tropy given the GXDH assumption and the GCAN assumption
[9] are true or in the generic model where the adversary is only
allowed to manipulate encodings via oracle access.
When parameters M and N are large enough, our basic
scheme achieves the same security as the naive scheme and
the security proof is roughly the same as proofs provided in
[9]. Due to both completeness considerations and the page
limit, below we present the proof sketch for the high entropy
input distribution case only and neglect the proof in the generic
model.
Theorem 1. When M and N are large enough so that all Pr[i]
are different, Algorithms 1 and 2 are secure when (~v,W ) is
drawn from a distribution where the entropy of ~v given W is
superlogrithmic given the GXDH assumption and the GCAN
assumption are true.
Proof: Same as [9], by claiming Algorithm 1 and 2 are
secure we mean that, for each rule r, anything that the cloud
firewall provider or the adversary learns from the execution of
the two algorithms can be learned from a blackbox firewall by
constructing a simulator S that simulates the adversary’s view
from algorithms 1 and 2 given only the access of a blackbox
firewall.
In particular, the adversary’s view is the obfuscated firewall
output by Algorithm 1:
(
{C[i]}i∈[M+N ], {r
′}, Pzt, params
′
)
.
S simulates {C[i]}i∈[M+N ] with 4(M+N) uniformly random
level-1 encodings: ({u′i,0, v′i,0, u′i,1, v′i,1}i∈[M+N ]). S first runs
InstGen and get a random P ′zt and random public parameters
params′′. For each r′, S can simulate Pr with n different ran-
dom samplings in [M +N ] , simulate (un+1, vn+1) with two
uniformly random level-1 encodings: (u′n+1, v′n+1), simulates
A with A itself, and simulates Pzt and params′ with P ′zt and
params′′. Due to the GCAN assumption and the entropy of ~v
given W is superlogrithmic, we know un+1, vn+1 is indistin-
guishable from uniform thus is independent with any pair in
{C[i]}. In addition, due to the GXDH assumption, we know
each C[i] is indistinguishable from (u′i,0, v′i,0, u′i,1, v′i,1), and
(un+1, vn+1) is indistinguishable from (u′n+1, v′n+1). Thus we
know S simulates the algorithm 1’s output for ((~v,W )) input.
For algorithm 2’s output, the S can simply use the access of
the blackbox firewall to get it.
When M and N are not large enough, Algorithm 1 reveal
partial information about the rules. The leakage could happen
when for different rules r1 and r2, there exist i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}
such that Pr1 [i] = Pr2 [j]. In this case, the adversary would
notice similar “wildcard or not” information between two bit
locations in two rules. We can figure out that the probability
for such leakage is 1 −
( ( M|W1|)·(
M−|W1|
|W2|
)
( M|W1)·(
M
|W2|
)
)
·
( ( Nm1)·(N−m1m2 )
( Nm1)·(
N
m2
)
)
=
1−
( (M−|W1|)!·(M−|W2|)!
M !·(M−|W1|−|W2|)!
)
·
( (N−m1)!·(N−m2)!
N !·(N−m1−m2)!
)
, in which the
W1, W2 is the wildcard bits set in r1 and W2 each, and m1 =
n−|W1|,m2 = n−|W2|. So if such leak is unacceptable, we
may increase the value of M and N in practice.
2) Analysis of the Blocking Scheme: The main difference
between the basic and blocking scheme is that Algorithm 3
“encrypt”s each integer in each field rather than “0” or “1”
on each bit. For similar reasons as Algorithm 1, we also give
a proof sketch for Algorithm 3’s security in the case of high
entropy inputs and leave out the detailed proofs. Note that
Algorithm 3 itself achieves the same security as the naive
scheme’s security. So when integrated with basic scheme, the
blocking scheme is as secure as Algorithm 1.
Theorem 2. Algorithm 3 is secure when (~v,W ) is drawn
from a distribution where the entropy of ~v given W is
superlogrithmic given the GXDH assumption and the GCAN
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assumption are true.
Proof: The proof goes similarly as the Proof of
Theorem 1. The only difference here is S simulates
algorithm 3’s output
(
{(ui,j , vi,j)}i∈[k],j∈Ii , uk+1, vk+1
)
with 2Σk1 |Ii| + 2 uniformly random level-0 encodings:
({u′i,j , v
′
i,j}i∈[n],j∈Ii , u
′
k+1, v
′
k+1). Due to the GXDH assump-
tion, we know for each i ∈ [n], {< u′i,j , v′i,j >}j∈Ii is
still indistinguishable with {< ui,j , vi,j >}j∈Ii . Due to the
GCAN assumption and the entropy assumption, we know
each {< ui,j , vi,j >}j∈Ii and (uk+1, vk+1) are independent
with each other, and (uk+1, vk+1) is indistinguishable with
(u′k+1, v
′
k+1). Therefore, S simulates algorithm 1’s output for
((~v,W )) input.
3) Analysis of the Divide-and-Conquer Scheme: The
divide-and-conquer scheme break the matching of one rule
into several k parts. It is easy to see it has the same amount
of security except it reveals the matching results of all parts
in addition.
VII. EXPERIMENTS
To evaluate the feasibility and performance of SOFA, we
implement our algorithms in C++, and carry out experiments
on real-world firewall rules. The cryptographic multilinear map
we employ is the one constructed over integers [10], [22].
A. Experiment Setup
Our experiments are conducted on a PC running Linux with
2.90 GHz Inter(R) Core(TM) i7 CPU and 8 GB RAM. And
we use 50 standard real-world firewall rules to evaluate the
scalability of our algorithms. Note that our blocking scheme
can also deal with the extended rules with minor modification.
To leave out unnecessary details, these rules are preprocessed
such that only the fields in the IP/TCP header are included in
r. In reality, many firewall rules belong to this type.
The generation of an instance of a practical multilinear map
involves the configuration of many parameters [10]. And the
configuration will affect its performance and usability, which
is related to the control of the “noise”. So it should be tuned
with specific application. Thus we do not present the tedious
detailed parameters of our experiments here. Instead our
settings ensure the “noise” in our experiments is under control
such that no correctness will be sacrificed for efficiency.
B. Primitive Cryptographic Overheads
The procedures of GES that we have defined are the basic
steps in our algorithms, so we first measure the efficiency
of these primitive cryptographic operations. We set the mul-
tilinearity level κ=5, 9 and 33, which are the parameters
for obfuscating a standard rule each for the basic scheme,
the divide-and-conquer scheme and the one with blocking
approach. The results are shown in figure 1.
We can observe from the results that the ring sampler
takes only less than 1 millisecond. The encoding and re-
randomization procedure are always performed together, so we
measure them together, and we can observe that the multilin-
earity level affects its running time greatly. The multiplication
procedure is the major operation in the second phase, and it
can be seen that its efficiency is also strongly affected by
the multilinearity level, which determines the specific system
parameters. We can also see that the zero testing procedure is
relatively lightweight in computation overheads.
C. Performance in Obfuscation Phase
The first phase, the obfuscation of original firewall rules,
is performed locally by the enterprise SDN controller. We
first measure the impact of the bit numbers n (note that the
corresponding multilinearity level in GES is n + 1) on the
performance of naive scheme (Fig.2a). The time overheads of
procedure Instance Generation and the obfuscating time of a
single standard rule are measured separately. From Fig.2a, we
can see that both of them grow linearly with respect to the bit
size. Specifically, when n = 32 ( which we need when naive
scheme is adopted to protect the standard rules), the first takes
about 0.8 seconds, while the obfuscating for a rule takes about
4.1 seconds. This shows the inefficiency of naive scheme.
And we also measure the scalability of the schemes we
proposed (Fig.2b, Fig.2c, Fig.2d) and the effect of basic
scheme on other approaches. The results show that by the
encodings compression of our basic scheme, the obfuscation
of original rules can be greatly accelerated. This is in line
with our theoretical analysis. These results also show that our
framework is elastic with different number of rules.
D. Performance in Execution Phase
The performance in the second phase, the real-time execu-
tion of the obfuscated firewalls in the cloud, is more crucial.
We measure our solution’s performance in this phase with
different number of rules, the result is shown in Fig.3. From
the result we can see that the blocking scheme is much more
efficient. Actually, we find that the running time to check
a packet with them is separately 300, 100, 6 milliseconds.
Considering that our experiments are performed on a ordinary
PC and no modern firewall process acceleration techniques
(such as FDD) are adopted, our schemes, especially blocking
scheme, are practical. And in practice, when adopted in cloud
processing, many parallelism and acceleration means can be
taken to make our scheme faster.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose solutions to make it secure for an
enterprise to outsource firewalls. The security of our schemes
have solid theoretical foundation. And the experiment results
show that our schemes are also practical to use.
There are more other network functionalities, such as IDS,
IPS, that can be outsourced, and their privacy issues must be
considered too when outsourcing. We think the framework we
propose also works for them because many of them are also
based on packet header filtering. But since their configurations
are different from firewalls, so the specific solutions to them
will also vary. We leave this as our future work.
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